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Two different issues arise when the American experience in Vietnam
is considered in the context of the Nuremberg trials and related inter-
national conventions: the issue of "legality" and the issue of justice.
The first is a technical question of law and history-by the standards of
international law as formally accepted by the great powers, how is the
American war in Indochina to be judged? The second question is more
elusive. It is the question of proper standards. Are the principles of
Nuremberg and related international law satisfactory and appropriate
in the case of great power intervention as in Vietnam and Czechoslo-
valia, for example? The recent study of Nuremberg and Vietnam by
Telford Taylor-the chief counsel for the prosecution at Nuremberg,
a historian, professor of law, and retired Brigadier-General-is devoted
to the first of these topics, but occasional remarks bear on the second as
well. It is possible that Taylor's brief but informative study will set the
framework for much of the subsequent debate over war crimes and
broader questions of proper international conduct. Though conserva-
tive in assumptions and narrow in compass-overly so, in my opinion-
Taylor's investigation leads to strong conclusions. He comes close to
suggesting that the military and civilian leadership of the United States
during the period from 1965 to the present are liable to prosecution as
war criminals, under the standards of Nuremberg. No less controversial
are the self-imposed limitations of his study. In many respects, Taylor's
book offers a convenient point of departure for an investigation of the
issues of legality and justice.
t Ferrari P. Ward Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. BA.
1949; M.A. 1951; Ph.D. 1955, University of Pennsylvania.
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I. "War Crimes" and "Justice"
The issue of justice is not to be discounted. International law is in
effect a body of moral principles accepted as valid by those who ratify
treaties and other agreements. Furthermore, as Taylor emphasizes,
treaties and manuals "are only partial embodiments of the laws of war."
The preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention, for example, states that
questions not covered should be resolved by "the principles of the law
of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public
conscience."'. It therefore makes sense to inquire into the acceptability
as well as the political and social content of such principles as have
been codified and generally adopted, and to consider them in the light
of the dictates of public conscience and the laws of humanity, unclear
as these may be. As to "usages established among civilized peoples,"
Justice Jackson, in an interim report to the President in 1945, wrote
that "[w]e are put under a heavy responsibility to see that our behavior
during this unsettled period will direct the world's thought toward a
firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct, so as to make
war less attractive to those who have governments and the destinies of
peoples in their power."2 How have we met this responsibility in the
postwar era? The question touches not only on the legality of American
conduct in the light of Nuremberg and related principles, but also on
the character of these principles themselves.
Taylor's discussion of the Nuremberg judgments reveals a funda-
mental moral flaw in the principles which emerged from those trials.
Rejecting the argument that the bombing of North Vietnam constitutes
a war crime, Taylor observes that "[w]hatever the laws of war in this
field ought to be, certainly Nuremberg furnishes no basis for these
accusations."3 Yet this bombing has laid waste most of North Vietnam,
including large cities with the exceptions of Hanoi and Haiphong. 4
1. T. TAYLOR, NummERG AND V=NrmAIX: AN Axr.RmcAN TRAGFry 29 (1970) [hereinafter
cited to page number only].
2. P. 77.
3. P. 142.
4. Whether Taylor is aware of the extent of American bombing in North Vietnam is
unclear. Other commentators are not. For example, Neil Sheehan wrote: "Although the
North Vietnamese may not believe it, in the North a conscious effort was made to bomb
only military, and what limited industrial targets were available, and to weigh probable
civilian casualties against the military advantages to be gained .... Sheehan, Should
We Have War Crimes Trials?, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1971, § 7, at 3, col. 4. The thirty-
three books which Sheehan reviews in this piece contain much evidence to the contrary,
and Sheehan does not explain why he discounts that evidence. From my own limited
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The reason the law of war crimes does not reach American bombing
is straightforward:
Since both sides [in World War II] had played the terrible game
of urban destruction-the Allies far more successfully-there was
no basis for criminal charges against Germans or Japanese, and
in fact no such charges were brought.5
Aerial bombardment had been used so extensively and ruth-
lessly on the Allied side as well as the Axis side that neither at
Nuremberg nor Tokyo was the issue made a part of the trials.0
Similarly, charges against German Admirals for violating the London
Naval Treaty of 1930 were dismissed after testimony by Admiral Nimitz,
which "established that in this regard the Germans had done nothing
that the British and Americans had not also done." 7 The Nuremberg
Tribunal ruled that the German admirals should be subjected to no
criminal penalties for their violation of international law, because the
laws in question "had been abrogated by the practice of the belligerents
on both sides under the stress of military necessity." 8 Taylor concludes
that "[t]o punish the foe-especially the vanquished foe-for conduct
in which the enforcing nation has engaged, would be so grossly inequi-
table as to discredit the laws themselves." 9
From such comments we can derive the operational definition of
"crime of war" as conceived at Nuremberg. "Criminal acts" were to be
actually treated as crimes only if the defeated enemy, but not the vic-
tors, had engaged in them. No doubt it would be "grossly inequitable"
to punish the vanquished foe for conduct in which the enforcing nation
has engaged. It would, however, be just and equitable to punish both
victor and vanquished for their criminal acts. This option, which Taylor
does not mention, was not adopted by the postwar Tribunals either.
The Tribunals instead chose "to discredit the laws themselves" by re-
stricting their definition of criminal conduct in such a way as to exclude
punishment of the victors. 10
observations in the neighborhood of Hanoi, I join the North Vietnamese in "not be-
lieving it." Nor do I think that Sheehan would "believe it" if he were to walk through
the ruins of Phu Ly or Thanh Hoa, let alone the much more heavily bombed areas
farther from Hanoi. Nevertheless, the bombing of North Vietnam, despite its enormous







10. Justice R.E. Pal, dissenting at Tokyo, argued that the dropping of the atom
bomb was a criminal act exceeding any charged against those accused at the Tokyo trials,
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The conclusion that Nuremberg is to be understood as the judgment
of victors, rather than as the achievement of a new level of international
morality, is reinforced by Taylor's discussion of aggressive war. The
distinctive contribution of Nuremberg, he points out, was to establish
the category of crimes against peace: "Planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances," or "participation in a common plan
or conspiracy" to this end." "In terms of substantive international law,"
Taylor writes, "and in the mind of the general public, the salient fea-
ture of the Nuremberg trials was the decision that individuals could
be held guilty for participation in the planning and waging of 'a war
of aggression.' "1' "Indisputably it was a cardinal part of the postwar
policy of the United States Government to establish the criminality
under international law of aggressive warfare .... 1
But, Taylor argues, a court could hardly decide the question of
whether the United States has violated the anti-aggression provisions
of the Nuremberg or United Nations Charters. 14 For one reason,
"the evidentiary problems would be well-nigh insuperable." At Nurem-
berg and Tokyo, the allies had access to secret diplomatic and military
document files, which would not be made available by the United
States and South Vietnamese governments. "Total military victories
such as those that ended the Second World War are comparatively rare
in modern history, and it is difficult to envisage other circumstances
INTERNATIONAL MArrARY TR uNAL 'oR Tam FAR EAST 621 (1953) (Dissentient Judgment of
Justice RB. Pal). The relevant passages are cited in N. CHossny, AEMucAN Poxym AND TIl
NEv MIANDAINS 168-69 (1969). Pal did not, however, suggest prosecution for the decision
to use the atom bombs. Taylor believes that the Nagasaki bombing, at least, can be con-
sidered a war crime. P. 143.
11. P. 79; INTL L. CoMnieN, REPORT, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), reprinted in THE LAW OF NATIONS 1021 (2d ed. H. Briggs 1952).
12. P. 84.
13. P. 76.
14. One might raise the question whether the Nuremberg and United Nations Char-
ters are equivalent in status. I will not pursue the question here. But it does seem to
me, as argued below, that there is a powerful case that the United States has grossly
violated both in Indochina.
The recent release of documentary evidence on American planning before 1965 (TAE
N.Y. TntEs, THE PENTAGON PAERs 79-509 (Gold, Segal & Abt eds. July 1971)) would ap-
pear to go some way towards overcoming the difficulty regarding 'evidentiary problems"
that Taylor cites and, in my opinion, greatly overestimates. One of the interesting fea-
tures of these documents is how well they corroborate the interpretations of American
policy in Indochina that appear, for example, in F. SCHUMMsANN, P.D. Scor & R. ZE.nm,
THE PoLrICs OF ESCALATION IN VIETNAM (1966). The documentary record so far released
shows that the publicly available evidence was sufficient to determine the main lines of
American policy. Space limits prevent discussion here. However, these documents would
appear to provide direct evidence of a conspiracy to wage an expanding war of aggres-
sion and to violate the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding pacific settle-
ment of disputes.
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that would unlock the secret files."'15 But if only access to the secret
files can provide proof that aggressive war has been waged, then it
follows that the "salient feature of the Nuremberg trials" will normally
be relevant only to the case of an enemy that has suffered total military
defeat.
Actually, Taylor vacillates somewhat on the matter of proof of ag-
gression, in that he seems to trust the executive branch to make uni-
lateral judgments regarding aggression by other states, despite the "in-
superable" evidentiary problems. He writes that "until 1965 [he] sup-
ported American intervention in Vietnam as an aggression-checking
undertaking in the spirit of the United Nations Charter ... ."10 It was
in Taylor's opinion permissible for the American Executive to deter-
mine unilaterally that North Vietnam was engaged in aggressive war
prior to 1965, and to join South Vietnam in collective self-defense
against the armed attack from the North, under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. So uniquely competent is the United States to exercise
this judgment, he seems to believe, that is was unnecessary even to ad-
here to the provision in Article 51 that measures taken in the exercise of
the right of self-defense be immediately reported to the Security Coun-
cil,17 or to the provision in Article 39 that "the Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression" and shall determine what measures shall be taken.
In fact, I think that Taylor exaggerates the "evidentiary problems"
of determining whether the United States is engaged in aggression in
Southeast Asia, just as he underestimates the difficulty of establishing
that it was engaged in collective self-defense against armed attack. His
discussion of aggressive war seems to me inadequate in other respects
as well, a matter to which I return below.
There is a still more serious issue at stake when we consider the
acceptability of the principles of international law as codified in the
Charter of Nuremberg and elsewhere. These principles were formu-
15. Pp. 118-19.
16. P. 206. Whether Taylor still accepts this assessment is not entirely clear.
17. The United States formally submitted the Vietnam question to the Security Coun-
cil only in January 1966. 21 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1966, at 105, U.N. Doc. S/7105
(1966). Prior to that, the U.S. asked the Council to consider the (alleged) Tonkin Gulf
incident in August 1964 (19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sept. 1964, at 135, U.N. Doe. S/5849
(1964)), and submitted reports in February 1965 (20 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1905, at
43, U.N. Doc. S/6174 (1965)) after the sharp escalation of American bombing in South
and North Vietnam. See United States Dep't of State, The Legality of U.S. Participation
in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 474 (1966), reprinted in Tnt: Viar,
NAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 590 (R. Falk ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as FALI-
VIE nA]. Direct United States military engagement began in 1961-62.
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lated by representatives of established governments, without the par-
ticipation of representatives of mass-based popular movements that
seek to overthrow recognized governments or that establish revolu-
tionary governments. Richard Falk holds that "from the perspective
of international order the capacity to govern is certainly an element in
claiming political legitimacy,"18 and Thomas J. Farer speaks of "the
dangerous ambiguity of just when the insurgency has achieved sufficient
status to require equal treatment."' 9 This point is crucial in assessing
Taylor's belief that the United States was engaged in an "aggression-
checking" undertaking in Vietnam, say, in 1962. In that year Ameri-
can officials in Saigon estimated that half the population supported the
NLF.20 Furthermore, there was no evidence of North Vietnamese
participation in any combat, and 10,000 American troops were in
South Vietnam, many directly engaged in military actions.2 1 Bernard
Fall noted that "since 1961 Americans die in Viet-Nam, and in Ameri-
can uniforms. And they die fighting."22 In March of 1962, United States
officials admitted that American pilots were flying combat missions
(bombing and strafing). By October, it was reported that thirty per
cent of all air missions in South Vietnam had American Air Force pilots
at their controls.m By late 1962 the United States was directly involved
in large military actions in the Mekong Delta and the Camau Penin-
sula.2 4 In a book published in 1963, Richard Tregaskis reported inter-
18. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A Response to
Professor Moore, 76 YA.E L.J. 1051, 1130 n.80 (1967), reprinted in FALK-VErNAm, supra
note 17, at 445, 480 n.80.
19. Farer, Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 COLUMt. L. REv. 266, 271
(1967), reprinted in FALK-VETNAM, supra note 17, at 509, 514.
20. R. SCIGLIANO, SOUTH VIEMAM: NATION UNDER STRESS 145 (1963). Scigliano was a
member of the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group.
21. See, e.g., G. KAHIN & J. Lwis, THE UNrrIm STATES IN VIEMNMT 137 (1967).
22. B. FAIL, STRET WrruoUT Joy 846 (1964).
28. N.Y. Times, Alarch 10, 1962, at 8, col. 4; Oct. 17, 1962, at 4, col. 3. The thirty per
cent figure excludes helicopter flights. By the beginning of 1964, the United States had 248
helicopters in Vietnam; by the end of the year, there were 327. See SHARP & WEsnToRELAND,
REPORT ON THE WAR iN ViETNAm (As OF 30 JUNE 1968) 85 (1968). By comparison, the
French never had more than ten operational helicopters in Indochina until April 1954.
B. FALL, STREET WrroTU JoY 242 (1964).
24. B. FAIL, THE Two VIENAMs 332 (1964). No North Vietnamese were discovered in
the Delta until 1968. American bombing of civilians in the Camnau peninsula in the early
1960s has been confirmed by Col. Fletcher Prouty (ret.), who served at the time in liaison
between the CIA and the Air Force. Review of the War, 'WNET-TV Channel 13, New
York, Feb. 15, 1971. American airstrikes on villages in the early 1960s have been con-
firmed by reporters. Malcolm Browne (AP correspondent in Vietnam from 1961) described
visits to hamlets that had been hit by napalm and heavy bombs in American air strikes:
"there is no question that the results are revolting. Unfortunately, the Viet Cong builds
bunkers so skillfully it is rarely touched by aerial bombs or napalm, except in cases of
direct hits. But huts are flattened, and civilian loss of life is generally high. In some,
the charred bodies of children and babies have made pathetic piles in the middle of the
remains of market places." M. BROWNE, THE NEw FACE OF WAR 118 (1965). Obviously, this
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views with American helicopter pilots who describe how the "wild
men" of the 362nd Squadron used to shoot civilians for sport in "solid
VG areas." 25 It has also been reported that in 1962, air commandos of
the Special Operations Force, "[w]earing civilian clothes and flying
planes with the markings of the South Vietnamese Air Force .. .at-
tacked Vietcong concentrations in the jungles.
'" 20
There is, in short, a good case that the United States was involved in
direct military attacks against indigenous popular forces in South
Vietnam as early as 1962. It would be fair to call this "aggressive war"
if, indeed, the capacity to govern is an element in claiming political
legitimacy. Suppose that one were to hold, on the contrary, that
governments recognized by the major powers are legally permitted to
call in outside force to put down a domestic insurgency, while insur.
gents are not entitled to seek outside help. Suppose further that this
rule applies even where the insurgents constitute the only effective
government in large areas and the only mass-based political organiza.
tion,27 and where these insurgents are asking support from a state
from which they have been arbitrarily separated by great power inter
vention and subversion. 2 If this hypothesized rule is an accurate in-
was known to the American command and civilian leadership. To cite only the most ob-
vious evidence, the introduction to Browne's book is written by Henry Cabot Lodge, then
between two terms as United States Ambassador to Vietnam. It should be noted that the
Tokyo Tribunal judged Cabinet members to be responsible for war crimes in connection
with the treatment of prisoners if, having knowledge of them, they did not resign. Sc
WAR CRINIES AND TnE AAmiERc.AN CONSCIENCE 195 (E. Knoll 8, J. McFadden eds. 1970) for
relevant excerpts from the Tribunal.
25. R. TREGASxIS, VrNA31 DLMY 108 (1963).
26. Robinson, America's Air Guerrillas-Will They Stop Future Vielnams?, Boston Sun.
day Globe, Jan. 31, 1971 (PAimDE), at 6, col. 3. It was the SOF, according to this account,
that conducted the raid against an abandoned prisoner of war camp near Son Tay In
North Vietnam, in November 1970.
27. Even Douglas Pike, who is often hardly more than a propagandist for the Amer.
ican government, admits that the NLF constituted the only "mass-based political party in
South Vietnam" and that in late 1964, it was impossible for the American-stpported
government to consider a coalition with the NLF, for fear that "the whale would swallow
the minnow." D. PIKE, VIET CONG 110, 861-62 (1966). Elsewhere, Pike has estimated that
in 1963, "perhaps half the population of South Vietnam at least tacitly supported the
NLF." D. PIKE, WAR, PEACE, AND THM VIEr CONG 6 (1969). See also p. 1461 supra, It Is, of
course, not very difficult for a great power to establish a government that will applaud
its intervention. For example, the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist 'arty,
the first "officially recognized" Congress since 1966, opened with "applause and cheers"
for the Russian invasion of 1968. Boston Globe, May 26, 1971, at 2, col. 3 (Reuters).
28. I refer, in this instance, to the United States-supported refusal of the regime it
had instituted in South Vietnam to adhere to the election provision of the Geneva agree.
ments of 1954. Similarly, in Laos, when the Pathet Lao won an unexpected victory In the
election of 1958 (after substantial American efforts to buy the election for the Right), the
United States played a major role in the overthrow of the coalition government. Sea gen.
erally Ackland, No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos, In
LAos: WAR AND REVOLUTION (N. Adams & A. McCoy eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as AvAms
& McCoy]; Mirsky & Stonefield, The United States in Laos, in AmERIGA's AsIA 253123 (E.
Friedman & M. Selden eds. 1970).
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terpretation of the currently prevailing system of international law,
then the only appropriate conclusion is that this system of law is to be
disregarded as without moral force. Or, to be more precise, the con-
clusion must be that this system of law is simply a device for ratify-
ing imperial practice.
These questions do not arise in any direct way in Taylor's discussion,
in part because he scarcely touches on the pre-1965 period to which
they are directly relevant. Similar problems, however, are implicit in
his discussion of the legality of various modes of warfare. As already
noted, Taylor argues that aerial warfare is not intrinsically unlawful,
although the "silence of Nuremberg" on this matter raises questions
"especially relevant to American bombing policies ... in South Viet-
nam."2 9 The routine destruction of villages by American firepower and
ground sweeps and the forced evacuation of population are, he argues,
of doubtful legality, and reprisal attacks against villages harboring
Vietcong-official policy, as he notes-are a "flagrant violation" of the
Geneva Convention. 0 What is more, Taylor believes the establishment
of free-fire zones to be illegal31 But Taylor emphasizes the great prob-
lems in determining how legal principles should apply under the cir-
cumstances of Vietnam, where a superpower is using its technological
resources to destroy guerrilla forces that conceal themselves among
the population. The basic problem is this:
The enemy does not respect those laws, the terrain lends itself to
clandestine operations in which women and children frequently
participate, the hostile and the friendly do not label themselves
as such, and individuals of the yellow race are hard for our soldiers
to identify. As in the Philippines 65 years ago, our troops are
thousands of miles from home in uncomfortable, dangerous and
unfamiliar surroundings. No one not utterly blind to the realities
can fail to acknowledge and make allowance for the difficulties
and uncertainties they face in distinguishing inoffensive noncom-
batants from hostile partisans.32
The enemy "is undeniably in violation of the traditional laws of
war and the Geneva Conventions, based as they are on the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants" in two specific respects: the
enemy does not wear "a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
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as reaffirmed at Nuremberg, states that "a civilian who aids, abets, or
participates in the fighting is liable to punishment as a war criminal
... " This may seem harsh, Taylor writes, but "it is certainly the
law," 3 just as the law does not apply to aerial bombardment of towns
and villages in an effort to break the enemy's will or to deny him
material or human resources.
These observations come very close to branding "people's war" il-
legal, while permitting the use of the technology of the industrial
powers to suppress it. An essential feature of revolutionary people's war,
Vietnamese style, is that it combines political and military action, thus
blurring the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. The
Vietnamese revolutionaries in general attempted to follow the Maoist
injunction that "[a] bloodless transition is what we would like and we
should strive for it."34 Even Douglas Pike concedes that the NLF
"maintained that its contest with the GVN and the United States
should be fought out at the political level and that the use of massed
military might was in itself illegitimate," until forced by the United
States and the GVN "to use counterforce to survive."35 When the NLF
resorted to counterforce to survive, it exploited its natural advantage,
the ability of the guerrillas to blend into the sympathetic local popula-
tion, just as the United States exploited its natural advantage in the
technology of surveillance and destruction.
These characteristics of people's war were outlined years ago by the
leading Vietnamese communist ideologist Truong Chinh:
[There are] those who have a tendency only to rely on military ac-
tion. . .. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by
armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwill-
ing to give explanations and to convince people; . . . fighting
spiritedly, they neglect political work; they do not ... act in such
a way that the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one
another.86
Citing this passage, Bernard Fall noted that "once more, the enemy
33. Pp. 136-37. Whether it is "certainly the law" is open to question. There Is a logical
gap between Taylor's assertion that the laws of war require that combatants be Identified
and his further assertion that civilian combatants who are not so Identified are Iyar
criminals.
84. Cited by Goodstadt, Might and Right, FAR EASrERN EcoN. R1v., April 10, 1971,
at 22. Goodstadt observes that "physical force was always a second-best choice for Mao,"
35. D. Px=x, Vi-r CONG 91-92 (1966). Pike later observed that "armed combat was a
GVN-imposed requirement; the NLF was obliged to use counterforce to survive." Id. at
101.
36. TRUONG CHINH, LA aLSISTANCE VAINCRA (1947), cited in B. FALL, STREET WITOuT
Joy 372-73 (1964) (excerpt translated by Fall).
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has been kind enough to give us the recipe of his victory."37 The
recipe is to gain political support among the population and to en-
gage the population as a whole in the struggle against the central
government backed-in this case imposed-by foreign military force.
The participation of civilians in the revolutionary war reflects its po-
litical and social character, just as saturation bombing by B-52s based in
sanctuaries in Guam and Thailand reveals the essential political and
social character of American "counterinsurgency." The laws of war
rule the former illegal, while the silence of Nuremberg falls over
American practice. These laws, Taylor maintains, condemn as war
criminals the civilians who take up arms against a foreign enemy or
its local prot6g~s; such civilians are "undeniably in violation" of the
laws of war. But with regard to the American pilots who have de-
stroyed towns and villages and devastated farmland and forest, driving
millions from their homes and killing unknown numbers throughout
Indochina, or to those who planned this policy, the laws of war have
little to say. At most "the silence of Nuremberg . . asks [questions]
... relevant to American bombing policies ... in South Vietnam,"38
and presumably in Laos and Cambodia as well.
These laws, so understood, are the weapon of the strong, and are of
no moral force or validity. It is a political decision to accept an interpre-
tation of the law which holds that a government installed and main-
tained by a foreign power (as in South Vietnam or Hungary) has the
right to call upon this foreign power to suppress an insurgency that
has gained such extensive political support that insurgents are indis-
tinguishable from the population, and which holds that civilian
participants in the insurgency are war criminals. It is a political de-
cision to accept as valid the law that combatants must identify them-
selves as such to the soldiers of the foreign army, while that same law
raises no objection to the dispatch of soldiers "thousands of miles
from home" to "unlovely circumstances" in which they cannot dis-
tinguish noncombatants from partisans.
Though Taylor is quite right to insist on the difficulties and uncer-
tainties faced by these troops, there is no reason to withhold condem-
nation from the political leaders who sent them there, or to grant any
validity to the legal system that permits this while condemning the
enemy's recipe for victory: winning popular support and using this
support in the only way a popular movement can to overthrow the local
37. B. FALL, STr= WniouTr Joy 372-73 (1964).
38. P. 142.
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representatives of a foreign superpower. No reason, that is, apart
from the political judgment that a great power has the right to impose
a regime of its choice, by force, in some foreign land. The system of
law, so interpreted, is merely a ratification of imperialist practice.
Though Taylor is not entirely explicit, it seems that he accepts the
political judgment that the United States has the right to impose the
regime of its choice in South Vietnam. In his discussion of war aims,
he refers to "our stated policy," namely, "to gain and hold the political
allegiance of the South Vietnamese to a non-communist government,
while giving them defensive assistance against any military means
used by the North." 9 His only stated objection to this policy is that it
was unlikely to work, under the circumstances of Vietnam. As to the
"defensive assistance" against the North, surely he is aware that the
main NLF fighting units were indigenous from the start, and remained
so until the United States internationalized the war. He apparently
believes that it was legitimate for the United States to introduce its
military forces, as it did in the early 1960s, to gain and hold the politi-
cal allegiance of the South Vietnamese to the non-communist govern-
ment installed by the United States in 1954. Taylor refers to the
"deeply idealistic strain in the American interventionist tradition,"40
as when McKinley justified the war against Spain in 1898. This is a
very superficial historical judgment. Virtually every imperial power
has justified its actions on "idealistic" grounds. This was true of the
British and French empires, the Japanese in East Asia,41 and the
Russians in Eastern Europe. That the leaders and populations of the
imperial powers may even succumb to these delusions is hardly signifi-
cant. It is remarkable that the standards by which we would judge
other cases of imperial intervention seem so difficult to comprehend




41. On Japan's professedly defensive and idealistic motivations in the 1930s, see tile
references in Chapter II of N. CHOmSKY, AmEluCAN POWER AND Tim NEW IANDARINS 176.
77, 179-84, 189-90, 193-202 (1969).
42. American innocence in this regard is if anything surpassed by our British allies.
For example, the anonymous weekly columnist (presumably the editor) of the Far Easteril
Economic Review, generally a sober journal, writes, "it must be evident to any openlludcd
person that, whatever the effects of America's intervention in Vietnam, the action was
taken with the most idealistic of motives and with the best of intentions .... [To) claim
that the United States is in Vietnam for imperialist reasons . . . is manifest nonsense."
Column, Traveller's Tales, FAR EASTRN ECON. REv., Feb. 20, 1971, at 13. Conceivably one
might argue that despite ample evidence to the contrary, the United States is thus unique
in world history, but to insist on the certainty of this most dubious judgment Is merely
a form of hysteria. The columnist also demonstrates the neutrality of the Rcvi, aIs
contrasted with "committed" scholars: thus the Review, he writes, does not hesitate to
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Taylor asks whether the American conduct of the war, with forced
resettlement, complicity in the torture of prisoners, enthusiasm for
body counts, devastation of large areas to expose the insurgents, free-fire
zones, and the Son My massacre, was merely "a terrible, mad aber-
ration."43 He answers correctly that in part it was a consequence of the
specific features of the Vietnam war cited above, which make the laws
of war so difficult to apply. In fact, the policy of forced resettlement and
devastation of large areas of the country was a rational, perhaps even
a necessary response to the specific circumstances of the Vietnam war.
Bernard Fall, bitterly anti-communist and a strong supporter of the
American war before it reached its full fury, explained this fact very
well in the early 1960s.
Why is it that we must use top-notch elite forces, the cream of
the crop of American, British, French, or Australian commando
and special warfare schools; armed with the very best that ad-
vanced technology can provide; to defeat Viet-Minh, Algerians, or
Malay "CT's" [Chinese terrorists], almost none of whom can lay
claim to similar expert training and only in the rarest of cases to
equality in fire power?
The answer is very simple: It takes all the technical proficiency
our system can provide to make up for the woeful lack of popular
support and political savvy of most of the regimes that the West
has thus far sought to prop up. The Americans who are now fight-
ing in South Viet-Nam have come to appreciate this fact out of
first-hand experence.
Today, there is vastly more evidence to support Fall's conclusion.
"The element of real popular support is vital," he wrote.40 And it was
exactly this "real popular support" that led Washington to adopt the
policy of forced population removal that has reduced the peasantry
from about eighty-five per cent to less than half of the population,
"criticize what it regards as mistakes in [Amnerican] strategy or policy," or to publish
"bitter attacks on Vietcong atrocities ..... Id. True objectivity. The columnit also
prides himself on his "sophistication" for "printing one of the few editorials which at-
tempted to establish a sympathetic understanding for the troops who took part in the
massacre at My Lai," id., failing to note that the American peace movement, which he
denounces, had almost universally taken the same position, but without glor)inig in its
sophistication for this normal human response.
43. P. 152i
44. wFuL, supra note 36, at 373. Note that thit %%s written in the early 1960s, at a
time when Taylor "supported American intervention in Vietnam as an aggression.checking
undertaking in the spirit of the United Nations Charter." P. 20G. Three years after this
work appeared, Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before Congress that the Viet-
eong and the North Vietnamese were "operating,. . without, for all practical purposes,
a single wheeled vefifle in all of South Vietnam." Sed the statement by Senator 1'roxmire,
M'7 eoNO. R  S4585 (daily ed. Apt. 5, 1971).
45. B. FAL., supra note 36, at 378.
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while laying waste the countryside. If international law has nothing
to say about this (except that civilians aiding the resistance are war
criminals), then its moral bankruptcy is revealed.
II. "War Crimes" In Vietnam
The major topic that Taylor considers, however, is the more narrow
question of the legality of American actions in Vietnam when measured
against the framework of Nuremberg and related conventions. In his
analysis of the American intervention after 1965, Taylor concludes that
there is definite evidence that war crimes have been committed and
that culpability for these crimes extends to high levels of military com-
mand and civilian leadership. The evidence in this regard is extensive.
The primary example that Taylor considers is the My Lai massacre.
Dr. Alje Vennema, director of a Canadian hospital near the site of the
massacre, reports that he knew of it at once but did nothing because it
was not at all out of the ordinary. His patients were constantly report-
ing such incidents to him. The province of Quang Ngai, in which My
Lai is located, had been virtually destroyed. Half the population had
been forced into refugee camps, and children were starving and
wounded.48 Colonel Oran Henderson, the highest-ranking officer now
facing court-martial charges for the My Lai massacre, states that "every
unit of brigade size has its Mylai hidden some place," though "every
unit doesn't have a Ridenhour."
47
This observation is borne out by direct testimony of veterans
throughout the country. To cite just a few random examples, a highly
decorated helicopter gunner testified in El Paso, Texas on May 5, 1971,
that of the thirty-nine Vietnamese he had killed, one was an old man
46. Interview in the Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 12, 1970. An American working In Quang
Ngai hospital estimated in 1967, a year before My Lai, that about seventy per cent
of the civilian war casualties there were caused by American and allied bombardment-
that is, in an area more or less under American control, where victims could reach
the city hospital. For quotations and references, see N. CuoMsxy, ANimucAN 1'owvet AND
Tm NEW MANDAMNS 284, and N. CHOMSKY, AT VAR WITH ASIA 270-71 (1970).
47. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1971, at 13, col. I (city ed.) The reference is to Ronald L.
Ridenhour, the Vietnam veteran who disclosed the incident to the Secretary of Defense
a year after it occurred. The incident had been noted at once by the NLF, along with
many other incidents that are still not acknowledged or discussed. Details were disclosed
in Paris on June 15, 1968, but were neglected by the Western media. For a justifiably
bitter account, see Wulff, Le crime de Song My: Avec les fdlicitations du commandant en
chef, AnasCAsiA, April 26-May 9, 1971, at 40, 41. Wulff is a West German physician who
spent six years in Vietnam and who testified concerning the "new 'Ouradours and Lid.
ices'" before the Russell Tribunal in 1967. His testimony is recorded in A Doctor Reports
from South Vietnam-testimony by Erich Wulff, in AcAINsT THE Cauem oF SIIxNcX 5i4-85
(J. Duffett ed. 1968).
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riding a bicycle and ten were a group of unarmed civilians. In each
case, he claims to have acted on direct order from his commanding
officer. A former member of the Coast Guard testified that his orders
were to pilot a small motorboat through Delta canals shooting ran-
domly into every village to see if there were inhabitants. In hearings
conducted by the Citizens' Commission of Inquiry on United States
War Grimes, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 1-3, 1970, a Medic in the 101st
Airborne Division testified that approximately twenty-seven civilians
in a peaceful meeting were killed in an unprovoked attack by American
tanks firing a barrage of tiny arrow-like nails. A Marine forward ob-
server testified that he counted twenty dead civilians after an unpro-
voked artillery strike on two villages. Another Marine corporal
testified that his unit was ordered to fire on starving civilians scavenging
in a garbage dump after their food supplies had been destroyed in
1966--rice fields had been napalmed to destroy food in this free-fire
zone. A former Army sergeant testified before an unofficial House
committee headed by Rep. Ronald Dellums that he took part in the
killing of about thirty unresisting Vietnamese civilians in the village
of Truong Khanh, near My Lai, in April 1969. This testimony was
confirmed to reporters by Vietnamese women in a refugee camp.A8
The Winter Soldier Investigation in Detroit produced voluminous
testimony on atrocities, 49 as have other inquiries.
A former helicopter gunner with 176 confirmed "kills" told re-
porter Joseph Lelyveld that his gunship was ordered to halt a flight of
peasants. When the pilot reported that he had no way to do so, he
received orders to "shoot them." Thirty or forty unarmed villagers
were then killed by the gunship. Trainees said that their instructor had
written President Nixon after the Calley verdict about his own involve-
ment in an incident in which six gunships attacked a village after a
helicopter crew member had been shot, the gunships killing 350 vil-
lagers.50
Refugees, reporters and other observers have presented voluminous
substantiating evidence. What is particularly important is that these
episodes appear to be quite routine:
I have personally accompanied a routine operation in which U.S.
Cobra helicopters fired 20mm. cannons into the houses of a typical
48. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1971, at 10, col 1 (city ed.); Boston Globe, May 10, 1971, at
2, col. 1.
49. 177 CONG. Rc. E2826-E2900 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1971).
50. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1971, at 26, col. 56 (city ed.).
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village in territory controlled by the National Liberation Front,
They also shot the villagers who ran out of the houses. This was
termed "prepping the area" by the American lieutenant colonel
who directed the operation. "We sort of shoot it up to see if any-
thing moves," he explained, and he added by way of reassurance
that this treatment was perfectly routine.0"
An official map of the 25th Infantry Division delineates large areas
subjected to artillery and air bombardment prior to the ground sweeps
of Operation Junction City in 1967. Within these areas there were
over twenty identifiable villages with a population of 5000, according
to earlier census figures.
N.Y. Times correspondent R. W. Apple writes that he heard the
"mere gook rule," according to which "anything that moves and has
a yellow skin is an enemy, unless there is incontrovertible evidence to
the contrary," repeated "100 times by majors and sergeants and pri-
vates." This, he writes, is "official policy, a part of everyday life." He
goes on:
Not so evident to the average rifleman, but clear enough to those
of us who have had an opportunity to travel about the country,
is a deliberate policy of creating refugees wherever possible. An
Army general , . . explained the idea to me as follows: "You've
got to dry up the sea the guerrillas swim in-that's the peasants-
and the best way to do that is blast the hell out of their villages
so they'll come into our refugee camps. No villages, no guerrillas:
simple,52
He adds further that Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, as well as
Presidents Johnson and Nixon, surely knew this.53
It is this policy of "no villages, no guerrillas"-the policy of destroy-
ing the rural society-that is referred to as "forced-draft urbanization
and modernization" by some of the more cynical academic technocrats
who deal with Vietnam: "a euphemism to end all euphemisms,""4 as
51. Statement of t. Opton, In WAlt Cam s AND -ME A=r=Vw CotscsNcr 114 (E.
Knoll & J. McFadden eds. 1970).
52. Apple, Calley: The Real Guilt, 81 NEw SrATEs,%tAN 449 (1971). The coercive
character of earlier population removal was also well understood by the American com-
mand, Sharp and Westmoreland wrote that the first Strategic Hamlet Program in March
1962 "involved forced relocation of rural peasants, notwithstanding their strong attach-
ment to their ancestral plots of land." SHARP & WESTmORELAND, supra note 23, at 79. This
report consists largely of apologetics and is not, in my opinion, to be taken very seriously.
unless independently confirmed, except with regard to the details of the American milU-
tary engagement.
53. Apple, supra note 92.
54. P. 202.
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Taylor appropriately comments. Apple's account indicates that this
policy was not inadvertent, something that the U.S. command "stum-
bled upon" in an "absent-minded way,"'" but rather was planned and
understood in advance.
Neil Sheehan's widely discussed article on war crimes" makes the
same point. Sheehan claims that "classified military documents spe-
cifically talk about bombing villages in communist-held areas 'to de-
prive the enemy of the population resource."' He refers to a secret
study in the summer of 1966 which proposed reconsideration of the
policy of unrestricted bombing and shelling which was "urbanizing"
the population.T This proposal was vetoed at the highest level of
American authority in Saigon, he writes. It was decided instead to
continue to employ "air and artillery to terrorize the peasantry and
raze the countryside." One of the basic American tactics was "unre-
stricted air and artillery bombardments of peasant hamlets"-"devas-
tation had become a fundamental element in [the American] strategy
to win the war." The rural civilian population was the target of the
American attack "because it was believed that their existence was im-
portant to the enemy." The idea was to defeat the Vietnamese commu-
nists "by obliterating their strategic base, the rural population. '"s
The United States authorities have a point when they argue that
My Lai is not the typical incident of the Vietnam war. More typical,
almost a story of the war in microcosm, is the village of Phuqui on the
Batangarn Peninsula, 180 miles southeast of Hue. In January 1969,
12,000 peasants in this region were forced from their homes in an
American ground sweep, loaded on helicopters and shipped to interro-
gation centers and a waterless camp near Quang Ngai over which
floated a banner saying "We thank you for liberating us from com-
munist terror." According to official military statistics, there were
158 NVA and VC dead and 268 wounded in the six-month campaign
of which this was a part. These refugees (who incidentally seem to have
included the remnants of My Lai) had lived in caves and bunkers for
55. This occasionally-heard explanation is plainly absurd, even If we believe its orig-
inal formulation by Samuel Huntington, The Bases of Accommodation, 46 FOnoGN A-
vAims 642 (1968). The Huntington article appeared prior to the massive escalation of the
American bombing in the countryside of Indochina. But if the effects of millions of tons
of bombs and thousands of square miles of defoliation could not have been predicted be-
forehand, which is difficult enough to believe, it was surely known by mid-1968.
6. See note 4 supra.
57. Cf. note 55 supra.
58. Sheehan, supra note 4, at 12, col. 4.
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months before the forced evacuation because of the heavy American
bombing and artillery and naval shelling. A dike was "blasted by
American jets to deprive the North Vietnamese of a food supply.6t9
As of April 1971, the dike had not been repaired: "As a result, the
salt water of the South China Sea continues to submerge the fields where
rice once grew." About 4000 refugees, including 1500 in Phuqui, have
since returned. Phuqui is now surrounded by 10-foot rows of bamboo.
It is under guard, and no one may enter or leave between 6:00 p.m.
and 5:00 a.m. "The hills that overlook the flooded paddies, once
scattered with huts, are 'ironed'-a word used by the peasants to mean
filled with bomb fragments, mines and unexploded artillery shells. B-52
bomb craters nearly 20 feet deep pock the hills." One reason why the
dike has not been rebuilt may be that-in the words of an American
official-"two years ago the people on the peninsula were written off
as communists. It would not be surprising if the attitudes still linger
among the Vietnamese today." Most of the population go without
basic food. "Province officials neither affirm nor deny police action to
limit the peasants' rice ... It has long been a practice to control the
supply of South Vietnam's food, however, to insure that the Vietcong
cannot eat excess peasant food." An American working in the province
said, "You might say that Phuqui has been forgotten."
Forgotten it has been, along with hundreds of other villages like it.
The American war in Indochina is a record of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, a record of mounting horror. For the reasons noted
by Bernard Fall in the early stages of the war,00 there may well have
been no alternative.0 ' The war has been directed against the rural
population and the land that sustains them. Since 1961-62 American
forces have been directly involved in bombing, strafing, forced popula.
tion removal of millions of peasants, crop destruction and defoliation,
destruction of agricultural lands and the irrigation system. The land is
59. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1971, at 16, col. 1 (city ed.). The quotations and most of the
cited material comes from this report. The rest is taken from an earlier report by Henry
Kamm in the N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1969, at 8, col. 5, and from a White Paper of the
American Friends Service Committee, AFSC, WHITE PAPER (May 5, 1969), which gives the
reports of Vietnamese-speaking field workers on the scene.
60. B. FALL, supra note 22, at xx.
61. It might be argued that domestic political considerations made it impossible for
the President to saturate Vietnam with enough American troops to obviate the need for
destructive firepower. Recall, however, that the French never sent conscripts to Vietnam
and probably deployed no more than about 70,000 native French troops in all of Indo-
china. For references on French military strength, see Chomsky, Mayday: the Case for
Civil Disobedience, Naw YORK REv., June 17, 1971, at 20 n.22. The American war In
Vietnam is unusual, if not unique, in that the public was willing to tolerate, for a titne,
the deployment of an enormous conscript army to fight what was in essence a colonial
war.
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pockmarked with millions of bomb craters. Lumber operations are
impossible in forests where trees are riddled with shell fragments. Some
six and one-half million acres have been defoliated with chemical
poisons, often applied at tremendous concentrations. Included are per-
haps one-half million acres of crop-growing land. South Vietnam, once
a major rice-exporter, is now importing enormous quantities of food,
according to Vietnamese sources. 02 About one acre in six has been
sprayed by defoliants. In many areas, there are no signs of recovery.
Crop destruction is done largely with an arsenical compound which may
remain in the soil for years and is not cleared for use on crops in the
United States. A contaminant in the herbicides, dioxin, is known to
be a highly potent agent causing birth defects in mammals. Through
1969, one-half million acres of forest had been destroyed by giant
tractors with Rome plow blades, widely used in other areas as well.
These areas are scraped bare. Nothing may grow again. Arthur
Westing, biologist, former Marine officer and director of the Herbicide
Assessment Commission of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, writes that "we may well be altering drastically and
detrimentally the ecology of vast acreages of South Vietnam."' ' "These
vegetational wastelands will remain one of the legacies of our presence
for decades to come" 6 --perhaps permanently.
The effects of these policies on the population can be easily imagined.
Hunger and starvation from crop destruction and forced population
removal have been noted since 1961.5 Millions of people had been
62. See note 65 infra.
63. Westing, Poisoning Plants for Peace, 16 FRmNvs J. 193 (1970). Figures cited in text
come from this article and that cited note 64 infra.
64. Westing, Ecocide in Indochina, NxruL Htsroay, March 1971, at 56, 59.
65. Ngo Vinh Long, Leaf Abscission, in ECOCIDE IN INDOCHINA 54 (B. Weisberg ed.
1970). Long mentions that crop destruction was used at that time to force the population
into strategic hamlets.
In Thoi-Bao Ga (a Vietnamese student journal published in Cambridge, Mass.) Long
writes that according to the Saigon newspaper Tin Sang, Nov. 12, 1970, the chairman
of the Committee on Agriculture of the GVN declared that American chemical de-
foliants had destroyed approximately sixty per cent of all crops in South Vietnam.
The March 9, 1971 issue of the Saigon daily Duoc Nha Nan reports that South Vietnam
imported one-half million metric tons of rice from the United States in 1970, enough, in
Long's estimate, to feed five million persons. Nevertheless, journalists and others report
widespread hunger, even starvation. THOI-BAO GA, March/Apr. 1971, at 6.
Bryce Nelson, an LA. Times reporter who was formerly a reporter for Science, writes
that an unreleased report of the AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commission notes the death
of ninety people within a four month period (September to December 1970) from expo-
sure to spraying and drinking water contaminated with herbicides. Village Voice, January
28, 1971, at 15, col. S. A former IVS worker with four years experience in South Vietnam
reports "numerous encounters" with farmers in Cantho and Tayninh provinces whose
crops were destroyed. He also reports seeing patients in Ta)ninh hospital "with limbs
and faces burned mercilessly by phosphorous" and "child after child scarred or disfigured
in some hideous way" in hospitals in the Mekong Delta. Letter to the Editor from Roger
Montgomery, N.Y. Times. Jan. 22, 1971. at 28, cols. 5-6.
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removed-often by force-into controlled areas, by the early 1960s.
After 1965, air and artillery bombardment and ground sweeps ac-
counted for the overwhelming majority of the refugees.
In South Vietnam, perhaps half the population has been killed,
maimed or driven from their homes. In Laos, perhaps a quarter of the
population of about three million are refugees. Another third live
under some of the most intense bombardment in history. Refugees
report that they lived in caves and tunnels, under bombing so inten-
sive that not even a dog could cross a path without being attacked by
an American jet. Whole villages were moved repeatedly into tunnels
deeper and deeper in the forest as the scope of the bombing was ex-
tended. The fertile Plain of Jars in Northern Laos was finally cleared
and turned into a free-fire zone. These refugees, incidentally, report
that they rarely saw NVA troops and that Pathet Lao soldiers were
rarely to be found in the villages. The areas in question are far from
South Vietnam or the "Ho Chi Minh Trails." In Cambodia, the
Kennedy subcommittee estimated that by September, 1970-after
four months of regular bombardment-there were about a million
refugees out of a population of about six million. The intensive bom-
bardment also has been reported by captured correspondents. Accord-
ing to Richard Dudman's direct observations in captivity, "[t]he
bombing and shooting was radicalizing the people of rural Cambodia
and was turning the countryside into a massive, dedicated, and effec-
tive revolutionary base."0' 6 As elsewhere in Indochina, this is both a
consequence and a cause of the American bombardment.
On April 21, 1971, Rep. Paul McCloskey, just returned from Indo-
china, testified before the Kennedy subcommittee that an Air Force
lieutenant colonel at Udom Air Force Base in Thailand said that
"there just aren't any villages in Northern Laos anymore, or in southern
North Viet Nam either, for that matter." Government reports, secret
until unearthed with great effort by McCloskey, confirm the over-
whelming evidence of refugee reports concerning the virtual destruc-
tion of large areas of rural Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao.0 7
Much the same is true in Vietnam. McCloskey quotes a top Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) official
who informed him, in Vietnam a year ago, "that in a single province,
66. R. DUDUAN, 40 DAYS Wrrg T14E ENEMY 69 (1971).
67. See N.Y. Times, April 22, 1971, at 8, col. 1 (city ed.), Boston Globe, April 16, 107i,
at 2, col. 3: Boston Globe, April 23, 1971, at 5, col. 1. See also 117 CoNo. R . H79-1.800
(daffy ed. Feb. 18, 1971) (formal testimony of Rep. McCloskey).
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Quang Nam, American and allied forces had destroyed and razed 307
of the original 555 hamlets of the province." He adds, "I was flown over
square mile after square mile where every village, home, and treeline
had been burned to the ground; this was part of a rice denial and
search and destroy program admittedly based on the need to deny the
Vietcong the ability to obtain food, hospitalization, cover and conceal-
ment which the villages would otherwise afford." 68
The United States Army Field Manual permits measures to "destroy,
through chemical or bacterial agents harmless to man, crops intended
solely for consumption by the armed forces (if that fact can be de-
termined). ' 68a Yet the descriptions of crop destruction cited above, and
those of the AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commission, suggest that
nearly all of the food destroyed would have been consumed by civil-
ians. It should be remembered that Goering was convicted at Nurem-
berg for crimes against humanity in part because of orders requiring
diversion of food from occupied territories to German needs, and that
the United States in Tokyo also supported prosecution of Japanese
military officials for crop destruction in China. 0
The province that McCloskey described, Quang Nam, is the subject
of a book by the former Senior AID official in the province, William
Nighswonger.70 He explains that "the battle for Quang Nam was lost
by the government to Viet-Cong forces recruited for the most part from
within the province." A major reason for their success was "the
progressive social and economic results" shown by their programs. As
elsewhere in Indochina, it was the success of the communist-led forces
in gaining popular support through successful programs7' that led to
68. 117 CoNG. REc. H796 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1971). Similar reports on Quang Ngai and
Quang Tin provinces were given in 1957, before the massive escalation of tce air war
in 1968. J. SCnELL, THE MILrrARY HALF (1968).
68a. U.S. DEPir OF Awn, THE LAw OF LAND WARFARE 18, para. 37 (196) (Dep't of
Army Field Manual FM 27-10).
69. Statement by George Bunn, Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin and
formerly General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Broad Im-
plications of the Continued Use of Ijerbiddes in Southeast Asia, AAAS Annual Meeting,
December 29, 1970 (mimed).
70. W. N'IGHSwoNGER, RuaR.L PACIFICATION IN VmNAt (1957).
71. For discussion, see Race, How They Won, 10 AsN SutvZY 628 (1970); R. S,,Nsom,
TIM ECONOMICS OF INSURGENCY IN THE MEKONG DELTA OF VIETNAM (1970). Race was an
adviser to a District Chief in Long An Province, south of Saigon, while in the U.S. Army.
Sansom is an Air Force Captain and a member of the staff of the National Security Coun-
cil. Non-communist reporters who have visited NLF-controlled areas give substantiating
evidence. See the report by Jacques Doyon cited in Coh, t. oF CoccmIxEN Asm€
SCnOLARS, THE INDOCHINA STORY 36 (1970). See also KATsurcHi HONDA, THE NATIONAL 2aLm-
ATION FRONT (1968) and VmxNr: A VoIcE FROM THE VIILAGES (1967) (collections of articles
by Honda, privately translated and reprinted from the Japanese Journal Asahi Shimbun in
1967). Regarding Pathet Lao programs as seen by refugees, see the verbatim interview in
ADAis & McCoy, supra note 28, at 451-59 and N. CHomsie, AT WAR Wru As& 239
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the American effort to destroy the rural society in which the revolution
was rooted.
Robert Shaplen concludes that "the war's overall effects on the
Vietnamese have been cataclysmically destructive, not only in physical
terms but psychologically and socially."12 Furthermore, these effects
are overwhelmingly attributable to American firepower and tactics.
Unless one assumes a high degree of idiocy on the part of the American
command and the civilian leadership in Washington, it is necessary
to suppose that something of the sort was anticipated when these
tactics were designed. Furthermore, there is mounting evidence, some
of it just cited, that the probable effects were understood in advance,
and were even intended. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that
these tactics, though sharply intensified in 1965 and again in 1968, can
be traced back to the early 1960s. In fact the Diem regime, installed
and kept in power by the United States, initiated a virtual war on
peasant supporters of the Vietminh in the mid-1950sY3
In the face of such evidence, which has by now been recorded at
great length in many easily accessible sources, it requires a real act of
faith to doubt that the American command and the civilian authorities
are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the sense
of Nuremberg. In fact, it is difficult to understand the surprise or con-
cern over My Lai, considering the relative triviality of this incident in
the context of the overall American policies in Indochina.
Taylor observes, correctly and appropriately, that "[t]he war, in
the massive, lethal dimensions it acquired after 1964, was the work of
highly educated academics and administrators"-the Kennedy advisers,
the Rusks, McNamaras, Bundys and Rostows, who stayed on with
President Johnson and "who must bear major responsibility for the
war and the course it took."74 The same is true of the war in the years
1961-64, with its lethal effects-small, to be sure, compared with what
was to come, but nonetheless hardly acceptable by civilized standards.
It remains to discuss two essential points: first, the argument that
the American actions were permitted by "military necessity," and
second, the claim that U.S. intervention was justified in collective
(1970). See also Selden, People's War and the Transformation of Peasant Society: China
and Vietnam, in AMERIcA's ASIA (E. Friedman & M. Selden eds. 1970).
72. R. Shaplen, The Challenge Ahead, COLUM. JOURNALiSm REV., Winter 1970-71, at 40.
73. For some discussion and further references, see E.S. HERMAN, ATROciTiFs IN VIET.
NAM, ch. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HERMAN]. All of this was well understood at the
time. See, e.g., VITNAM: rE FIRsT FIvE YEARS (R.W. Lindholm ed. 1959).
74. P. 205.
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self-defense against armed attack, under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. Taylor discusses both of these matters, but in what
seems to me an unsatisfactory way.
III. Military Necessity
In a sense, it is correct that the American policy of "no villages, no
guerrillas" was based on military necessity. American planners were
well aware of the enormous popular support for the communist-led
resistance forces, the so-called 'Vietcong', and the lack of any significant
popular base for the government." Furthermore, there is no great
secret as to why the Vietcong were so successful in gaining popular
support.76
The Field Operations Coordinator of the U.S. Operations Mission,
John Paul Vann, circulated a report77 in 1965 on how the war should be
fought. His premises were that a social revolution was in process in
South Vietnam, "primarily identified with the National Liberation
Front," and that "a popular political base for the Government of
South Vietnam does not now exist." "The dissatisfaction of the agrar-
ian population... today is largely expressed through alliance with the
NLF," he wrote. "The existing government is oriented toward the
exploitation of the rural and lower class urban populations." Since it
is "naive," he explained, to expect that "an unsophisticated, relatively
illiterate, rural population [will] recognize and oppose the evils of
Communism," the United States must institute "effective political in-
doctrination of the population" under an American-maintained "auto-
cratic government." The document opposes mere reliance on gadgetry,
air power, and artillery, and rejects the expressed view of a United
States officer who stated, "if these people want to stay there and support
the Communists, then they can expect to be bombed." The report is
based on the further assumption that the social revolution is "not
incompatible" with United States aims, but that "the aspirations of the
majority" can only be realized "through a non-Communist govern-
ment." According to Vann, the United States should be the judge of
75. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 71 supra.
77. This report, untitled in my copy, was given personally by Vann in 1971 to the
Australian social psychologist Alex Carey, who has studied in particular the Australian
role in Vietnam. See Carey's carefully documented pamphlet, Australian Atrocities in
Vietnam 1-19 (undated pamphlet), which describes what he refers to as "our drift tovards
the standards of Hitler and the Gestapo."
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what would be "best" for the unsophisticated peasants of Vietnam.
The United States, he argued, must impose "a benevolently inclined
autocracy or dictatorship... while laying the foundation for a demo-
cratically oriented [government]." Vann's report expresses the benev-
olent face of imperialism. It is outspoken in its colonialist assumptions.
From Taylor's few remarks on the subject, one might surmise that
he would agree with Vann's proposals and leading assumptions.
As already noted, Taylor accepts the legitimacy of the effort to "gain
and hold the political allegiance of the South Vietnamese to a non-Com.
munist government,"78 while doubting the possibility of doing so.
He regards faulty judgment and over-reliance on military means as the
primary defects of American policy.'09 He accuses United States
authorities of "under-maintenance": too much bombing and not
enough concentration on the "civil half."so He raises no objection to
the direct use of force in the early 1960s or to the support of large-scale
terror in the late 1950s in the interest of maintaining the regime that
the United States had installed."' Nowhere does he raise the fundamen-
tal question: Is it legitimate for the United States to use its power to
impose a particular social and political order on some foreign land,
supposing that it can do so within the limits of "proportionality" of
force applied? His discussion of the intentions of American leaders is
unsatisfactory in part because of his failure to raise this question. Thus
Taylor argues that to accuse "our leaders" of being war criminals "as.
sumes that the leaders wanted things to turn out as they have, whereas
in fact it is plain that those responsible are exceedingly dissatisfied with
the present consequences of their policies." 82 Taylor's point can be
saved from incoherence only by the assumption that the intentions of
American leaders-specifically, to win support for the government they
had installed-are legitimate and benign, and that these leaders can
be faulted only for having made errors of judgment along the way.
Surely Taylor would not argue that the defendants at Nuremberg
should have been acquitted merely because they, too, were "dissatis-
fied with the consequences of their policies."
Taylor believes that some of the American failures in Vietnam can
be traced to the fact that "the armed services no longer possess leaders




81. See note 71 supra.
82. P. 188.
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War."' This is an unfair criticism. The difference between World War
II and Vietnam has to do with the character of the wars, not the
character of the military commanders. The military in both wars was
entrusted with implementation of the policies laid down by the
civilian leadership. In the case of Vietnam, this was the policy of
"gain[ing] and hold[ing] the political allegiance of the South Viet-
namese to a non-Communist government." To implement this policy
effectively, the military command was compelled to abandon the benev-
olent imperialist pose and to destroy the rural society, the social base of
the revolution. The civilian leadership was well aware of what was
taking place and made no effort to change policy.
Ambassador Robert W. Komer, chief pacification adviser to the GVN
in 1967-68, explains that "U.S. military intervention had averted final
collapse of the coup-ridden GVN and had created a favorable mili-
tary environment in which the largely political competition for
control and support of the key rural population could begin again.""'
The United States escalation overcame the difficulty that there was
"little GVN administration... outside Saigon," and made it possible
ultimately to initiate the "comprehensive" and "massive" 1967-70
pacification program in an effort to cope with what was dearly "a
revolutionary, largely political conffict."85 Despite the qualms of the
benevolent imperialists such as Vann, it is difficult to see how this
aim could have been achieved except through the means employed,
namely, what Komer describes as "massive U.S. military intervention at
horrendous cost."88
In this sense, it can be argued that the horrendous cost of the Ameri-
can military intervention-including defoliation, forced population
removal, bombing, harrassment and interdiction, free-fire zones, and-
personnel weapons, the Phoenix program of assassination and terror, 7
83. P. 201.
84. Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam, 25 J. IN'7L Art.
48, 50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Komer]. He is referring to the outright American invasion
and bombing escalation in the South in February 1965.
85. Id. Recall the remarks by Richard Falk, p. 1461 supra, on capacity to govern as an
element in claiming political legitimacy.
86. Komer, supra note 84, at 49, 50, 55. These benevolent imperialists, it should be
noted, did not dissociate themselves from United States policies despite their reservations
even after the grim effects were obvious. See note 24 supra.
87. The Phoenix program is "aimed at neutralizing the clandestine Vietcong politico-
administrative apparatus, which many regard as the key to their insurgent capabilities."
Komer, supra note 84, at 53. "Neutralization" is bureaucratese for "assamssination or cap-
ture." Estimates as to the numbers "neutralized" vary. Deputy United States Ambassador,
William E. Colby, principal United States official in charge of pacification, testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that close to 20,000 were "neutralized" in 1969,
of whom 6,187 were killed. For comparison, the Saigon government claims that 4,619
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the torture of prisoners to gain information-was a military necessity,
and thus no crime if military necessity justifies departure from the
language of international agreements. All of this is arguable given the
essential premise that the United States was justified in intervening by
force in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" to guarantee the
rUle of the regime it had originally imposed in 1954 and its successors-
the rule of the landholding and urban elite, the military officers, and the
Northern Catholics who provided the social base for a regime that was
clearly incapable of holding out on its own against a domestic insur-
gency.
The question whether this premise is valid arises in its sharpest
form in the pre-1965 period with which Taylor does not concern him-
self. By 1965, as Vann noted,8 8 these questions of principle were largely
irrelevant. After the "large scale participation by U.S. ground forces,"
he wrote, "it is almost inconceivable that the United States will with-
draw from Vietnam short of a military victory or a negotiated settle-
ment that assures the autonomy of South Vietnam." 89 The same view
was held by civilians close to the Administration, including some who
were later to become outspoken doves. Thus Richard Goodwin wrote
in 1966 that continued American combat was justified by "the bedrock
vital interest of the United States" which must serve as the "single
standard" for policy formation, namely, "to establish that American
military power, once committed to defend another nation,00 cannot be
driven from the field."0 1
Even today, it is well understood by the American command that
military force must be used to destroy the political movement that the
civilians were killed by "the enemy" in 1969. The Phoenix program of course ac.
counts for only a small fraction of the civilians killed by combined American-GVN forces.
Len Ackland, a former IVS worker in South Vietnam and then a team leader and analyst
for RAND, points out that the Phoenix program is designed to capture or murder civil-
ians: "people who serve the political party, the National Liberation Front, as tax collectors,
clerks, postmen, etc." For references and further documentation, see N. ClioMsKY, AT WAR
WrrH ASIA 301-02 (1970); HERMAN, supra note 73, at 46-47.
88. See note 77 supra.
89. The latter phrase is a code-term, in American political terminology, for rule of
South Vietnam by a non-communist government. The NLF political program of 1962,
largely ignored-even suppressed-in the United States, called for the neutralization of
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. One might argue that this was a deception, but
it is unclear that the United States has unilateral authority to use military force in acting
on its skepticism.
90. This is another formulation of the inexpressible statement that South Vietnam must
be ruled by the American-imposed non-communist government. Goodwin was well aware,
and explains in this book, that the insurgency even at that time wag overwhelmingly
domestic.
91. R. GOODWIN, TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY 38 (1966). For many other expressions of related
views, see the citations and references in N. CHomsKY, AMERcAN POWER AND TiE Nmw
MANDARINS (1969), particularly, Chapter 3, The Logic of Withdrawal, 221-94.
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Saigon regime has never been able to defeat politically. A special intelli-
gence survey ordered by General John H. Cushman, top American offi-
cial in the Mekong Delta, warns that the enemy is expanding his
political network and "reverting to a political-struggle phase.""- Wil-
liam Colby adds that "we need to prevent the enemy from putting in
this network, because that will permit the Communists to revive later
on.''m3 Once again, given the premise that the United States has the
right to intervene to impose the regime of its choice, "military neces-
sity" could justify the continued use of overwhelming military force
against the Vietnamese, the Laotians, and the rural Cambodians as well.
It should be added that the premise that American military inter-
vention in other nations' affairs is justified is solidly enshrined in
American history. Taylor refers to the American conquest of the Philip-
pines at the turn of the century. Whatever "idealistic" motives McKin-
ley may have professed, the fact is that the United States overcame a
domestic popular movement by force and terror, at tremendous cost
to the native inhabitants. Seventy years later, the peasantry-three
quarters of the population-still lives under material conditions not
very different from those of the Spanish occupation.04 In Thailand,
a postwar effort at parliamentary democracy led by the liberal democrat
Pridi Phanomyong was overthrown by a military coup that reinsti-
tuted the Japanese collaborator who had declared war on the United
States. Substantial and continuing American assistance has supported
a terroristic regime that has willingly integrated itself into the Ameri-
can-Japanese Pacific system. Pridi, who had fought with the American
O.S.S. against the Japanese during World War II, found his way to
China. In Korea in 1945, the United States overthrew an already
established popular regime, making use of Japanese troops and col-
laborators. By 1949 the American command had succeeded in destroy-
92. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1971, at 4, col. 3 (city ed.).
93. Id. See note 87 supra (identifying William Colby).
94. In October 1937 President Manuel Quezon pointed out that while "[t]he rich can
live in extravagant luxury. . . . [t]he men and women who till the soil or work in the
factories are hardly better off now than they were during the Spanish regime.... [Thirty-
five years of American regime has brought him only disappointments and tomeimes,
despair .. . " G. TAYLOR, THE PHILIPPINES AND TIE UNITED STATES 21 (194). Taylor
adds much information to confirm this judgment and concludes that by the late 1930s.
"the mass of the people may have been worse off than before" the American occupation.
Id. at 85. The Bell report of 1950 revealed that inequalities of income had become even
more marked while the average standard of living had not reached pre-war levels. Id. at
137.
The director of the U.S. AID Mission in the Philippines, Wesley D. Haraldson, testified
before a House sub-committee on April 25, 1967 that the'condition of the average farmer
"has not changed in the last fifty 3'ears .... In the past ten years the rich have become
richer and the poor have become poorer." Haraldson cited in HasuAizwo J. AnYA., Tire
UNToiLD PHIjIPPiNE STonY 360 (1967).
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ing the existing unions, the popular local councils, and all popular
indigenous groups, and had instituted a right-wing dictatorship of the
wealthy elite and military-police forces--employing ample terror in the
process.
Vietnam is exceptional only because these familiar objectives have
been so difficult to achieve. The goal in Vietnam remains: to concen-
trate and control the population, separating it from main force
guerrilla units, and to create a dependent economy that adapts itself
to the needs and capacities of the industrialized societies of the West
(and Japan), under the rule of wealthy collaborators, with a mere
pretense of democracy. As to the peasants, one can recall the words of
a South Vietnamese writer speaking of the period of French domina-
tion: "the peasants [can] grit their teeth and nurse their hatred amidst
the paddy fields."95 And the residents of the miserable urban slums can
do the same.
This is in fact the model of national and social development that the
benevolent imperialists such as Vann offer to underdeveloped societies,
whether they are aware of it or not. It is to achieve such magnificent
results as these that they are willing to subject the population of Indo-
china, allegedly for their own good, to the benefits of American tech-
nology, as has been done in Vietnam for the past decade.
IV. Aggression and Collective Self-Defense
The final matter to be considered is what Taylor describes as the
"salient feature" of Nuremberg, namely the issue of crimes against
peace. As Taylor observes, the justification for the American inter-
vention in Vietnam can only be Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Invocation of this Article assumes that the United States is
engaged in collective self-defense against an armed attack from North
Vietnam. There has been extensive discussion of this matter. It is
curious that Taylor barely alludes to it and makes no effort to deal
with arguments that have been repeatedly presented in legal and his-
torical literature. 8 The fundamental problem in establishing the
95. Phi-VAn, The Peasants (Ddn Qu) , Appendix to NG6 ViNn LONG, CoLoNwzEn PEAS4
ANTS OF ViETNAm: 1900-1945, to be published by the Harvard East Asian Research Center.
96. See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF THE LAWYERS COMM. ON AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARDS VIETNAM (R. Falk, Chairman; J. Fried, Rapporteur), VETNAM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAV, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGALITY OF THE U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT (1967). See
also several papers in FALx-VENAr, supra note 17. The most recent study, which
appeared after Taylor's book, is W. STANDARD, AGGRESSION: oUR ASLN DISASTER (1971).
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United States case is that American military intervention preceded and
has always been far more extensive than North Vietnamese in-
volvement. (There is, in addition, a question as to the relative rights
of North Vietnamese and Americans to be fighting in South Vietnam,
after the unification provisions of the Geneva agreements were sub-
verted.) To cite one crucial moment, consider early 1965, the point at
which Taylor begins to have doubts about the legitimacy of the Ameri-
can involvement. Chester Cooper, who had been directly involved in
Southeast Asian affairs since 1954 and was in charge of Asian affairs for
the White House under the Johnson Administration, wrote:
Communist strength had increased substantially during the first
few months of 1965. By the end of April it was believed that
100,000 Viet Cong irregulars and between 88,000 and 46,000
main-force enemy troops, including a full battalion of regular
North Vietnamese troops, were in South Vietnam. Meanwhile
American combat forces were moving into South Vietnam at a
rapid rate; in late April more than 35,000 American troops had
been deployed and by early May the number had increased to
45,000.97
The single North Vietnamese battalion of 400-500 men was tentatively
identified in late April. s
In February 1965, the Johnson administration attempted to justify
97. C. COOPER, THE LoSr CRUSADE: AssamcA u' VimrAu 276-77 (1970) (emphasis
added).
98. For detils see T. DRAPR, ABusE or PowER 7382 (1967). There has been no attempt
to respond to Draper's devastating critique of Administration claims regarding the North
Vietnamese troop involvement in the South. The astonishing internal contradictions sulfice
in themselves to make the Government case unbelievable. See also the references in note
96 supra. Recall that this North Vietnamese battalion was allegedly detected in the South
two and a half months after the regular bombing of North Vietnam had been initiated,
eight and a half months after the first bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam in
a "reprisal" for an inddent which probably never occurred. The Government claims
regarding North Vietnamese aggression in Laos and Cambodia are no more compelling.
For an analysis of what information exists, see N. Cnosssity, AT WARt wTht Asu 11 7-82.
187-252 (1970) and D.G. Porter, After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality, in Amers &
McCoy, supra note 28, at 179. See also J.C. PomoNri & S. TnIoN, DEs CotmmrliNS Aux
PARTisANs 13If (1971); Pearson & Smilowitz, Biting the Fishhook, BuLL. or Coe=Ecn AsAi
ScajoLAR.s, Fall 1970, vol. 2, no. 4, at 80.
TnE PExTAGON PAPms, supra note 14, provides new information relevant to North
Vietnamese troop commitment. The first report that North Vietnamese troops had
entered "into the order of battle" appears in a CIA memorandum of April 2r, 1965,
referTing to a regiment of the 325th Division, which had been reported as possibly in the
area since February. This regiment allegedly was operating In northwestern Kontum
Province in 11 Corps. Evidently, the evidence was not very compelling. As late as July 2,
1965, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton expressed his concern "about the
increasing probability that there are regular PAVN forces either In the II Corps area or
in Laos directly across the border from II Corps." The documents also reveal that in late
April a United States force level of 82,000 along with 7,250 "third country" troops was
approved, and that General Westmoreland's request of June 7 for 44 battalions (a total
force level of almost 194,000) was approved on July 30.
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the new escalation with a White Paper, which, Cooper notes, "proved
to be a dismal disappointment." The problem was that "the actual
findings [regarding North Vietnamese involvement] seemed pretty
frail." No regular troops could be identified. As for infiltrators, even if
allegedly "known" and "probable" infiltrators were combined, the
average southward movement beginning in 1959, when the insurrection
was already solidly in progress, was "little more than 9000 per year,"
which did not "loom very large" as compared with the one-half million-
man Saigon army and the 23,000 regular American troops deployed.
"The information on enemy weapons," he observed, "was even less
earth-shaking." The three 75mm. recoilless rifles of Chinese communist
origin, forty-six Soviet-made rifles, forty submachine guns and one
automatic pistol of Czech origin that had been captured (and that might
have been bought on the open market) did not seem too impressive
as compared with over $860 million in military assistance given by
the U.S. to the Saigon government since 1961.09 In fact, the weapons
of communist origin constituted less than two and one-half per cent
of the captured weapons, as I. F. Stone noted at the time.100
As to the infiltrators, the figures seem even less impressive when we
recall that so far as is known, these were overwhelmingly South Viet.
namese returning to their homes. It is difficult to see why this should
be impermissible, after the subversion of the Geneva agreements and
the American and Saigon violations of the Geneva Accords,101 the
Diemist repression, and the renewal of guerrilla war in the South in
1957. Furthermore, Cooper makes no mention of the "infiltration" of
trained South Vietnamese into South Vietnam by the United States
after training at American military bases; nor, for that matter, of the
saboteur groups and guerrilla teams of South Vietnamese infiltrated to
99. C. COOPER, supra note 97, at 264-65.
100. Stone, A Reply to the White Paper, I.F. Stone's Weekly, March 8, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
101. "It appears from the International Control Commission's reports that through
February 28, 1961, about 154 violations had been registered against the South and only
one violation against the North." R. SCIGLIANO, supra note 20, at 154. Sclgliano argues
that the North has the advantage of being "more acute, or devious" and that the
"inability of ICC teams to perform their duties . . . is much greater in North than In
South Vietnam." R. SCIGuIANO, supra note 20, at 155. Perhaps. However, one ICC Report
states: "As has been revealed in the preceding paragraphs, the degree of co.operation given
to the Commission by the two parties has not been the same. While the Commission has
experienced difficulties in North Vietnam, the major part of its difficulties has arisen III
South Vietnam." INT'L CONTROL COMM'N, SIXTH INTERIM REPORT OF TIE INT'L COMM'N FOR
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM, CMNO. No. 51, at 26-51 (1957), reprinted in VirT
NAM: HISTORy, DOCUMENTS AND OPINIONS 170-72 (M.E. Gettleman ed. 1965). On the
matter of the obligations of North and South Vietnam with regard to the Geneva agree-
ments, see Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, in FALn-VIETNAm, supra
note 17, at 201, 209-16.
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the North since 1956, according to Bernard Fall.10 2 Nor, finally, does
Cooper mention that the American troops had been directly involved
in military operations since 1961-62.
All in all, the case that the U.S. was merely exercising the inherent
right of collective self-defense against an armed attack from North
Vietnam is frail indeed. Yet one who defends the legitimacy of the
American involvement must go beyond even this and claim that the
United States had the right to determine unilaterally that there had
been "aggression from the North" and to escalate its already substan-
tial military involvement in South Vietnam, by-passing the stipulations
in the United Nations Charter concerning the role of the Security
Council in determining the existence of a threat to peace. Unless all
of this is accepted, one must conclude that the American military ac-
tions are illegal, and themselves constitute aggression-that there was
aggression not from the north, but from the east.
Unfortunately, Taylor has virtually nothing to say about these
frequently-debated questions. His treatment of the matter of aggres-
sion is, in general, unsatisfying. In discussing the allegation that North
Vietnam is guilty of aggression in South Vietnam, Taylor points to
"strong evidence." "Indisputably, the ground fighting has all taken
place in South Vietnam," not in North Vietnam. But, he argues, the
case is not dear, since the Geneva Agreements merely established two
"zones" and explicitly declared the military demarcation line to be
"provisional" and not "a political or territorial boundary."' 0 Further-
more, South Vietnam, with United States support, declined to proceed
with the scheduled elections. Of course, if it is unclear whether North
Vietnam is guilty of aggression, it is correspondingly unclear whether
American military action is justified by Article 51, which in fact speaks
not of "aggression," but of "armed attack," a narrower category.10'
Furthermore, the "strong evidence" that Taylor cites and questions
cuts other ways as well. Thus, for example, ground fighting has taken
place in South Vietnam, not the United States. By Taylor's standards,
there is thus "strong evidence" that the United States is guilty of ag-
gression in South Vietnam, particularly since American authorities
102. Fall, Vietnam: The Agonizing Reappraisal, 48 Cupxzr HsroR Y, Feb. 1965, at 95.
For further references see N. CHOmsKY, AMEXCAf, POWER AND THE NY MANDXZUS 242-43,
281-82. For further confirmation, see J. ZAsLorF, POLmCAL hIOVATION OF Em Virr CoNG:
THE VTmrNH REGROuPEES, RAND Memorandum RM-4703/2-ISA/ARPA, at 124 (May
1968).
103. Pp. 101-02.
104. See note 96 supra.
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have admitted that the GVN had little administrative authority out-
side of Saigon by 1965.105 Taylor never considers this question in his
discussion of aggressive war.01° Rather, he states the case for possible
American aggression as follows:
[T]he case... is based on the conclusions that both South Vietnam
and the United States violated the Geneva Declaration of 1954
by hostile acts against the North, unlawful rearmament, and re-
fusal to carry out the 1956 national elections provided for in
the Declaration, and that the United States likewise violated the
United Nations Charter by bombing North Vietnam.107
But these charges constitute only part of the case. A much more
serious charge is that the United States has engaged in aggressive
warfare in South Vietnam in violation of the provisions of the United
Nations Charter concerning the use of force. These charges are based
on military actions taken against an insurgency which the United States
recognized to be popular and successful-far more popular than the
government it had installed and maintained, which had lost the war
by 1965 despite the absence of any regular North Vietnamese troops.
Taylor does not mention these matters, I presume, because of his tacit
assumption that the United States had the right to intervene with its
ground, helicopter and air forces in what some American authorities
have recognized to be a "revolutionary, largely political conflict." 100
It might be argued that the stipulations of the United Nations
Charter regarding the threat or use of force (specifically, Article 2(4))
have been so eroded as to be effectively inoperative. The issue is dis-
cussed by Thomas M. Franck in a recent study.100 He discusses "the
changed realities of the postwar quarter-century" that have so shattered
the precepts of Article 2(4) that "only the words remain."110 Franck is
surely right in arguing that "both super-Powers have succeeded in
establishing norms of conduct within their regional organizations which
have effectively undermined Article 2(4),"111 beginning with the insis.
105. See pp. 1477.79 supra.
106. Taylor's only reference to the issue is the following, in a different context: "When
we sent hundreds of thousands of troops to South Vietnam, bombed North Vietnam,
and moved into Cambodia, were our national leaders as guilty of launching a war of
aggression as were Hitler and his generals ... ?" P. 13. The question is not taken up
again.
107. Pp 96-97.
108. See p. 1479 supra.
109. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use ol
Force by States, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
110. Id. at 809.
111. Id. at 832.
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tence by the United States "that a state's sovereignty is subject to the
overriding right of a region to demand conformity to regional stan-
dards. 1"1 2 An example is the United States condemnation of "not inter-
vention by foreign troops but of a 'foreign' ideology,""13 as in the
Guatemalan affair of 1954. This was the direct precursor of the
Brezhnev doctrine. Franck is also correct in observing that "national
self-interest, particularly the national self-interest of the super-Powers,
has usually won out over treaty obligations."'114 It might be added that
the United States has developed a concept of "regional organization"
that incorporates large parts of Southeast Asia in a "regional organiza-
tion" where it assumes the right to operate freely, and that the violations
of Article 2(4) can arguably be traced back to the immediate postwar
activities of the great powers in securing their spheres of influence.
The British and then American interventions in Greece, beginning in
1944, would be particularly significant examples.
Despite his observations on the behavior of the great powers, Franck's
discussion seems to me to be flawed by an implicit bias in favor of these
powers. In discussing the "changing nature of warfare" he cites two
categories: "wars of agitation, infiltration, and subversion carried on
by proxy through national liberation movements,"m'n and nuclear wars.
With respect to direct violations of Article 2(4), it is of course the
first category that is of primary concern, notwithstanding the great
powers' attempts to disguise their interventions on grounds of a pre-
sumed relation to great power conflict. But Francks discussion of this
category begs the basic question. As he points out later in the same
article, "One man's war of national liberation is another's aggression
or subversion, and vice versa."AIG His bias is revealed in that he continu-
ally takes the position of the second man: the new kinds of warfare
which, he argues, have led to the erosion of Article 2(4) are characterized
as wars of infiltration and subversion carried on by proxy. If, taking
the contrary view, these should be characterized as imperial interven-
dons to repress movements of national liberation, then it follows that
the erosion of Article 2(4) has not been caused by the "changing reali-
ties of the postwar quarter-century,""17 but primarily by the postwar
forms of the traditional behavior of great powers. By begging the ques-
112. Id. at 834.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 836.
115. Id. at 812.
116. Id. at 820.
117. Id. at 809.
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tion in the particular way he does, Franck takes his stand, without argu.
ment or even explicit assertion, on the side of the great powers. This
bias is only partially mitigated by his later references to a third factor in
the erosion of Article 2(4), namely, "the increased authoritarianism of
regional systems dominated by a super-Power. 118
A similar bias appears when Franck refers to the "significant sup-
port"1 19 given to indigenous communist insurgents by China in Laos and
South Vietnam, for example. He cites no evidence. The available evi-
dence indicates that Chinese aid has always been small as compared to
that given by the United States and its allies to the right-wing forces.
Franck's reference to propaganda as a form of intervention hardly
applies in this case. China's position has generally been that wars of
national liberation must be indigenous and cannot rely on China for
substantive material support. Incidentally, so far as is known, the only
Chinese troops fighting in the Indochina war are the Chinese National-
ist troops employed by the United States, particularly in clandestine
operations in Laos.
The same questions are begged when Franck asserts that "the small-
scale and diffuse but significant and frequent new wars of insurgency
have, by their nature, made clearcut distinctions between aggression
and self-defense.. . exceedingly difficult. '120 Thus he points out that it
strains credulity "to be told that Poland had attacked Germany or
South Korea the North,"'12 but in the case of wars of national liberation,
"it is often difficult even to establish convincingly"' 22 who is the aggressor.
He might have used a different analogy. It would strain credulity to
be told that Hungary attacked the Soviet Union in 1956, or that the
Philippines attacked the United States at the turn of the century, or
that the American colonies attacked England in 1776. If one takes the
view that wars of national liberation and great power interventions
constitute a continuation of the classic pattern, to be sure with certain
modifications, then these are more appropriate analogies, and there is
nothing strikingly new about the postwar period.
As to the outside support for wars of national liberation, recall the
vast support given by the French to the American colonies in the
revolutionary war.
118. Id. at 835.
119. Id. at 813.
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There is no question but that the American Revolutionary War,
when considered as a 'normal' insurgency, entirely fits the bill of
the many revolutionary wars which afflict the middle of the twen-
tieth century. Shorn of almost two centuries of 4th-of-July oratory,
it was a military operation fought by a very small armed minority
-at almost no time did Washington's forces exceed 8,000 men
in a country which had at least 300,000 able-bodied males-and
backed by a force of 31,897 French ground troops and 12,660
sailors and Marines manning sixty-one major vessels. 12
Even compensating for the effect of 4th-of-July oratory, we would have
no difficulty in evaluating the bias of a contemporary British writer
who referred to the American revolution, in Franck's terms, as a war
of agitation, infiltration and subversion carried on by proxy through
a national liberation movement. Taking Fall's point of view, which
I believe to be much closer to accuracy than the position implicit in
Franck's discussion, we must conclude that there is no strikingly new
factor in the postwar era that led to the erosion of Article 2(4). Rather,
one must agree with U Thant, I believe, when he says, in words that
Franck quotes: "In the final analysis there can be no solid foundation
for peace in the world so long as the super-Powers insist on taking
unilateral military action whenever they claim to see a threat to their
security"1 4-- or, we may add, a threat to the perceived self-interest of
dominant social groups.
While it is beyond question that what remains of Article 2(4) is
"only the words," there seems no reason to suppose that this is any
change from earlier norms or that it is a consequence of changes in
world affairs that could not have been foreseen by the framers of the
United Nations Charter. There is, furthermore, no reason to accept
the conclusion that the precepts of Article 2(4) should not be considered
applicable. Of course, these precepts suffer from the absence of an
enforcing authority, which is a general defect of international law.
The question of the right of intervention and the threat or use of
force by the great powers to impose social and political arrangements
in developing countries should be at the forefront of any investigation
of Vietnam, whether in the light of Nuremberg or in a broader his-
torical context. By failing even to raise such questions, Taylor reduces
his discussion to marginal significance, it seems to me. For future policy
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decisions, these are surely the major issues. In a dozen places in the
world the United States is providing military support to regimes that
are attempting to suppress internal insurgency, in ways that might lead
to direct military intervention.1 25 It can be plausibly argued that in
Greece it is the American military support for the Colonels that pre-
vents a popular insurgency. In much of Latin America, the same is true.
Almost all Latin American regimes can now suppress rural insur.
rections of willful foes. Because of a number of factors, none is as
weak as Fulgencio Batista's government of the 1950s. U.S. AID's
Public Safety Division has trained police as a first line of defense
against terrorism in at least 14 republics; armies are better equip-
ped as $1.75 billion in U.S. military aid has poured into the
Americas; upward of 20,000 latino officers and enlisted men have
trained at Ft. Gulick in the Canal Zone, and now available are
new antiguerrilla weapons developed in Vietnam, which run the
gamut from specially designed helicopters to body smellers. 120
These remarks recall the observation of General Maxwell Taylor in
1963 that in Vietnam "we have a going laboratory where we see sub-
versive insurgency... being applied in all its forms." The Pentagon,
recognizing "the importance of the area as a laboratory," had already
sent "teams out there looking at the equipment requirements of this
kind of guerrilla warfare."' 2 7 There is considerable evidence, in fact,
that the United States has exploited Vietnam as a laboratory for coun-
terinsurgency, testing weapons and tactics for the wars it anticipates in
much the same way that other powers used Spain in 1936-39.1" S
Among the Latin American regimes that are using the technology de-
signed in the Vietnam laboratory for countering insurgency, there are
several that owe their existence to interference from the United States.
In Guatemala, a promising reform-minded regime was overthrown by
United States subversion in 1954. For the past several years there has
been a virtual bloodbath, as some 4000 peasants were killed indiscrim.
inately, in the course of an anti-communist extermination campaign,
125. For recent discussion of this possibility, see Goldstein, The American Political
System and the Next Vietnam, 25 J. INT'x. Asr. 91 (1971).
126. George IV. Grayson, Jr., Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1971, § B (editorials), at 8, col.
4. Grayson is Associate Professor of Government at William and Mary College, a specialist
in Latin American politics and the theory of revolution.
127. Hearings on Dep't of Defense Appropriations Before a Subcomm. of the Ho e
Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), cited in M. Klare, The Pentagon's
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supra note 24, at xi.
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with weapons supplied by the American military aid program. Donald
Robinson reports that he observed a Special Operations Force team
training Guatemalan Air Force men to use newly designed Bell heli-
copters to pursue guerrillas.1 30 It is even possible that there was still
more direct United States military involvement. Vice President Mar-
roquin Rojas claimed several years ago that American planes based in
Panama were conducting raids in Guatemala and returning to their
Panamanian bases, using napalm in areas suspected of harboring guer-
rillas.' 3 ' Missionaries working in Guatemala report that they have seen
the results of napalm raids.
The extent of American involvement in counterrevolutionary war-
fare in the postwar period cannot be realistically estimated. There is
enough information available to indicate that it is very great. While
the United States is surely not alone in undertaking forceful interven-
tion in the internal affairs of other nations, no other power in the
postwar period has employed even a fraction of the military force used
by the United States in its efforts to destroy indigenous forces to which
it has been opposed in other lands.
It is this general policy of counterrevolutionary intervention, raised
almost to the level of a national ideology during the Kennedy adminis-
tration and inherent in Henry Kissinger's doctrine of "limited wars,"'
32
which must be reconsidered if we are to be serious about an inquiry
into national policy or into the general issues of legality and justice
raised and sometimes skirted at Nuremberg, approached but rarely
faced directly in treaties and international agreements, and forced upon
the consciousness of any civilized person by the tragedy of Vietnam.
129. Gall, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1971, § 7
(Book Review), at 35, col. 3. The leader of the campaign, he points out, is now the elected
President of Guatemala; his regime is the most brutal in the country's history, with large
numbers killed in early 1971, including members of the legal noncommunist opposition.
130. Id. See also note 26 supra. These operations, incidentally, are world-wlde. Accord-
ing to the same report, Col. Fletcher Prouty states that Air Force-CIA units that pre-
ceded the formation of SOF flew Tibetan tribesman to Colorado for combat training and
then returned them to Tibet; a resistance force up to 42,000 was organized, he claims.
Robinson also reports that they form part of the American counter-insurgency operations
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131. Marcel Neidergang, Violence et Terreur, Le Monde, Jan. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
132. See particularly H. KtssINwr, NucLFR WExPoNs AND A..EUCaw FornaN POLicy
132-233 (1957); H. KissINGER, THE NEc.SSrrY FoR Cnoica 57-98 (1961). Kissinger discusses
"limited war strategy" within the framework of great power conflict. If we ask ourselves
where these "limited wars" will be fought, however, a different interpretation suggests
itself. In fact, each of the superpowers regularly interprets its efforts to maintain its
hegemony within its own empire as a defense of some principle (freedom, socialism) from
the encroachments of its rival. In this respect, the cold war has served the leadership of
the superpowers as an admirable propaganda device for mobilizing their respewive
populations behind expensive and dangerous efforts to maintain imperial dominlons.
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